CHAPTER 20

Situating the Child in Context
Attachment Relationships and Self-Regulation in Different Cultures

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01.23.97 I am on a forest trail somewhere in the Ituri Rain Forest. I am about a half a kilometer from Ooboobi's camp and still I can hear shrieks of delight and hilarity as Efe men, women, and children prepare for what promises to be a night's worth of dancing at a local village. Everyone is celebrating a good rice harvest after a long hunger season. I know what to expect—women braiding hair and body painting anyone who asks, children practicing their dance steps, little ones wearing newly woven waist belts. What I didn't expect however was Kamisiku wearing a coveted shirt I gave to my friend Ooboobi for this event. A bit surprised and maybe even a little bit angry, I asked Ooboobi why Kamisiku had my shirt on. “Well,” she replied, “she asked for it, and I couldn't deny her.” But I said, “Now you'll go to the dance mbuchi” (in this instance meaning without a top to wear).

A few months later I sit with my husband under the stars enjoying the quiet that comes with darkness. So the rustling of leaves on the forest path comes as a surprise because it heralds a late night visitor. “Hodi,” we hear, “usiangopa, mibaiko baloxi” (Hello, don't be afraid, I am not a spirit). Standing in the forest opening is Ooboobi carrying a 20 liter container of palm oil and 10 kilograms of plantains (a goodly amount of desirable food). As she sits, Ooboobi tells us of her good luck getting the food and asks if we would store it for her so she doesn’t have to share it away with the other families in her camp.

Sharing is an assumed part of Efe life; it is part of what it means to be an Efe. Infants' experiences with sharing begin as soon as they are born, with camp members participating in their care. But, what is sharing? Is Ooboobi acting out of obligation when she gives her shirt away and out of choice when she hides her food? Is the latter but not the former an autonomous action?

We start our chapter with Ooboobi and the decisions she makes because they crystallize for us some of the thorny issues we consider in this chapter on attachment and self-regulation—issues of autonomy, internalization, and integration. These issues are closely tied to cultural differences in “healthy” development and “ma-
ture” ways of being in the world—fundamental concerns of this chapter.

Much of the research on attachment relationships and self-regulation builds on long-standing philosophical and theoretical traditions that prioritize the individual and the psychological processes of autonomy and internal cohesion (of which internalization and integration are the basis). This theoretical legacy may be one reason why the antecedents of attachment relationships and of self-regulation—sensitive and responsive parenting—are similar, and why attachment and self-regulation lead to similar forms of later social competence (Miller, 2004). We do not doubt that these relations exist—at least for children growing up in communities that emphasize autonomous and internally cohesive ways of being in the world. However, in communities that emphasize other ways of being, antecedents and consequences may be different.

In this chapter we examine traditional accounts of attachment relationships and self-regulation in infancy and early childhood, as well as the experiences that foster their healthy development. Of primary interest is whether personal qualities such as autonomy and internal cohesion are important to the development of these psychological processes in people everywhere. We begin with a brief review of self-determination theory, because the psychological needs described by this theory (e.g., autonomy), as well as the process of developing autonomous forms of motivation (internalization and integration), are also cornerstones of the development of healthy attachment relationships and self-regulation. These Western-oriented traditions consider the self as agentic—an organizer of action and an integrative center of experience (Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997; Stroufe, 1996), internally controlled, and relatively unchanging across contexts. We next present a view on self-systems prevalent in non-Western communities that takes into account ways of being a person in the world that emphasizes qualities such as harmony and interdependence rather than autonomy and independence. What is important to this self is the self-in-context, and we consider the implications of this self-system for the psychological processes associated with attachment relationships and self-regulation, as well as the care experiences underlying their development. We end with a consideration of self-coherence and its relation to different notions of the self.

TRADITIONAL (WESTERN) THEORIES

Self-Determination Theory

What motivates people to carry out activities that—unlike exploration and novelty seeking—are not inherently or intrinsically satisfying? Why, for example, does a child give up her chair to a visitor, only to be left sitting on the floor? Why does a father use the little money he has to send his youngest son but not his oldest daughter to school? And why does a mother participate in genital cutting ceremonies to mark her daughter’s transition to adulthood? Self-determination theory addresses these questions.

Scholars working in this tradition believe that behavior is governed by external forces (the child might be punished if she did not let the visitor sit in her chair) or by personal volition (a child explores the environment because she wants to and chooses to do it). What distinguishes motivations along this continuum is the extent to which regulations are perceived as autonomous (Ryan & Deci, 2000a, 2000b). Self-determined regulations are freely chosen (internalized), fully integrated with other aspects of self, and experienced as authentic. On the other hand, regulations that are neither internalized nor integrated are a “controlled regulation... executed without being processed, coordinated, or endorsed by self” (Ryan et al., 1997, p. 707).

The need for autonomy, one of three universal needs posited by self-determination theorists, is best met in infancy and early childhood by caregivers who are appropriately contingent and receptive to their child’s signals; who structure and support their child’s endeavors in nonintrusive, unobtrusive, and fittingly challenging ways—following the child’s lead and fostering her sense of control and competence; who respects the child as a separate person with a will of her own; and who are warm and positive in their involvements. Grolnick and Ryan (1989) consider as exemplars of good parenting adults who value autonomy as a goal first and foremost, even at the expense of obedience and conformity; who rely on encouragement, praise, and reasoning to motivate children; and who are nondirective, preferring not to impose their will—including when children are in problem-solving and decision-making situations. When the need for autonomy is met, the person is more integrated intrapsychically (actions, thoughts, and feelings originate from self and internally cohere) and socially (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
There is a great similarity between self-determination theory and traditional accounts of attachment relationships and self-regulation in the prioritizing of personal agency, control, and internal cohesion, and in the qualities of care important to the development of these processes. The need for autonomy lies at the heart of all three theories.

Attachment Theory

05.16.96 I am within meters of Afikhe’s camp, and as is customary I announce my arrival with a chorus of hodies and greet people by shaking their hands asking while doing so if they have “beaten the morning”—unashinda. As I approach the chief’s family, I see that his daughter is there with her toddler son. The toddler is clearly alarmed by my approach, but still his mother stretches out his arm and hand to allow me to shake it. However, as she does so, he digs in his heels, arches his back, and lets out a howl that rivals any I’ve heard before. The camp is utterly amused by this and begins to tease the child as he takes refuge behind his mother’s back, dragging her breast with him. I am nonplussed. The Efe often get children to do things by telling them that the “white woman” is going to take them away if they don’t, and I have sent many an unfamiliar child galloping into the arms of someone they know, tears streaming down their faces. I sit next to the chief, and watch amusedly as the toddler first peeks at me with breast in mouth, and slowly comes out from hiding to sit on his mom’s lap. His mom takes the opportunity to tell him how I gave his grandfather medicine when he was sick, shows him the shirt I brought to welcome him, and asks him to greet me. His mom again stretches out his hand, and this time he allows me to shake it.3

Attachment theory is concerned with a child’s developing sense of self, other people, and relationships (Sroufe, 1996; Weinfield, Sroufe, Egeland, & Carlson, 1999), and it is psychology’s most influential theory of relatedness. Confidence in self, what to look forward to from others, and the capacity for close relationships develop during the first year of life, based on a child’s history of experiences with the people who care for him. These experiences, and the beliefs and expectations that develop from them, are represented by the child as “internal working models” (Bretherton, 1992). Early care experiences also play a role in the regulatory abilities the child develops, and together the child’s internal working model and regulatory abilities form the basis for how well he or she functions now and later on in life, both personally and interpersonally (Sroufe, 1996).

The core tenets of attachment theory originate in the work of Bowlby. He focused initially on the protective functions of the attachment system that promote infant survival (in order to reproduce). Accordingly, attachment system behaviors consisted of “any form of behavior that results in a person attaining or maintaining proximity to some other clearly identified individual who is conceived of as better able to cope with the world. It is most obvious whenever the person is frightened, fatigued, or sick, and is assuaged by comforting and caregiving” (Bowlby, 1988, pp. 26–27).

However, Bowlby, along with Ainsworth and others, increasingly recognized the importance of broadening the function and set goal of the attachment system beyond infant survival and proximity to include the support of the infant’s innate drive for exploration and mastery of the immediate and social world made possible by “felt security” (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991).

Ainsworth’s contributions to attachment theory included the concept of secure base, maternal sensitivity to infant signals, and patterns of infant attachment relationships; she also developed a procedure to test empirically assumptions related to attachment theory (Bretherton, 1992). This procedure, known as the Strange Situation, assesses individual differences in infants’ relationships with their caregivers when stressed (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). Particular attention is paid to how well infants organize their attachment and exploratory behaviors when reunited with their caregiver after a short period of time alone or with an unfamiliar person (secure base phenomenon, see below). Infants who respond to their caregiver positively upon her return and who are able to use their caregiver as a base from which to explore the environment are characterized as being secure in their relationship. Insecure infants, in contrast, do not seek contact with their caregiver on her return (avoidant) or they are not able to become calm in her presence (ambivalent), and they do not use their caregiver as a secure base.

Attachment Relationships and the Secure Base from Which to Explore

Attachment theory places great importance on the child’s ability to explore the environment
and aspects of the child’s relationship with caregivers that makes this possible. Exploration with the support of caring others is one way the child is able to gather information about her inanimate and social environment and develop mastery over it. This mastery is important to the child’s developing sense of self as competent and autonomous.

Exploration in and of itself does not promote autonomy in the child; the quality of the child’s attachment relationship must be considered as well; in fact, it is the balance between exploration and attachment that matters. Healthy autonomy develops when the child is able to use his caregiver as a “secure base” from which to explore the environment, because he feels sufficiently protected and comforted by her presence. Children who do not experience this felt security—who neither view their caregiver as someone they can trust nor themselves as worthy of support—are not able to achieve the same confidence in their mastery of the environment, in themselves, and in others (Weinfield et al., 1999).

The attachment and exploration systems work in tandem, balancing one another, with activation of one reducing activation of the other (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Bowlby, 1982). Together they function to keep the infant out of harm’s way and to enable him to explore the environment when all is safe. Although at any moment attachment and exploration are in opposition, over time they are complementary, and “infants who are effectively dependent will become effectively independent” (Weinfield et al., 1999, p. 76). As Bretherton writes, “Confidence in the mother’s physical and psychological availability appears to lay the groundwork for autonomous exploration and problem solving, coupled with the expectation that help will be forthcoming when needed” (Bretherton, 1985, p. 21).

Bretherton (1987) described sensitivity as “maternal respect for the child’s autonomy” (p. 1075) and three of the four scales developed by Ainsworth (1976) to evaluate caregiving emphasize autonomy supporting practices. For example, Ainsworth included in her description of the acceptance scale a mother who “values the fact that the baby has a will of its own, even when it opposes hers, . . . finds his anger worthy of respect, . . . [and] respect[s] the baby as a separate, autonomous person” (p. 4). She noted in her cooperation scale that the “mother views her baby as a separate, active autonomous person, whose wishes and activities have a validity of their own. . . . She avoids situations in which she might have to impose her will on him” (p. 4). Finally, for her sensitivity scale, Ainsworth stated that “it is a good thing for a baby to gain some feeling of efficacy. She nearly always gives the baby what he indicates he wants” (pp. 3–4). This conceptualization of sensitive and responsive caregiving is still the “gold standard” in the field.

Competence and Attachment Relationships

Attachment theorists maintain that sensitive and responsive caregivers foster children’s confidence to act effectively and autonomously both in early childhood and later in development. Children with different care histories fall short of developing the qualities that foster personal and interpersonal competence.

Research linking attachment security and competence support this claim, although the strength of the association between the two is modest. Thompson (1998) suggests that lack of theoretical clarity is partly responsible for this modest relation; attachment relationships should not foreshadow all aspects of later competence. He argues that there is little theoretical reason to expect a child’s attachment relationship to predict later cognitive ability, but there is every reason to expect it to predict later aspects of social and emotional competence that relate to a child’s representation of self, others, and relationships.

Children with secure attachment histories, compared to their insecure age mates, display more confidence and self-esteem, persistence in problem-solving tasks, and mature forms of exploration (Cassidy, 1988; Cassidy & Kobak, 1988; Grossmann, Grossmann, & Zimmermann, 1999; Matas, Aren, & Stroufe, 1978; Nezworski, 1983, cited in Wienfield et al.,

Sensitive Care and Security of Attachment Relationships

The ability of children to organize their attachment behaviors to balance their need for protection and felt security with their need for exploration, mastery, and autonomy relate to their history of care. The aspect of caregiving receiving the most attention is a mother’s sensitivity and responsiveness to her infant and young child (Ainsworth et al., 1978; de Wolff & van IJzendoorn, 1997).
Children with insecure attachment histories not only score lower on all of these measures but also higher on measures of other behavior problems. They are more likely to seek the attention and the physical closeness of adults at the expense of peer relations and to rely extensively on these adults for help.

Children with secure histories also enjoy more positive relationships with their parents and peers than do young children with insecure histories. These children experience more mutually rewarding experiences with their mothers (Thompson, 1998); they are more competent in their interactions with familiar peers and more popular with them (Ladd, 1999; Sroufe, 1983), and they are more social with unfamiliar adults than agemates with less secure attachment histories, perhaps because of their expertise in exploring the interpersonal environment (Thompson, 1998).

Self-Regulation Theory

I watch as EnaKpendule quietly enters camp with her three children following close behind. The sun is setting and they’ve been gone since early morning gathering food from the forest floor. This hunger season has been quite severe—taking its toll on the young and old alike. Kpendule, the oldest at age 4, looks around and sees other children helping their mothers, and joins her mother, who is emptying the basket of fruits and nuts. But as she does so she starts to cry—she is hungry and there is little to show for their day’s labor. Tears stream down her face, and every so often I hear a muffled sob, yet she continues to help, but now she is placing food on a plate for herself and her sisters. The three of them sit in a circle with the plate of food in the middle. Kpendule picks out just a few morsels and the second oldest does the same; neither says anything as the youngest takes much of what is there. Only a few minutes go by before they finish eating, and when they are done, they stumble into their hut to help their mother prepare their sleeping mats. As they settle down for the night, I hear Kpendule tell her sisters, “We shouldn’t cry, tomorrow we won’t be hungry. We will go to the water Uala and catch lots of fish.”

How children like Kpendule develop culturally appropriate ways of acting and feeling is of interest to researchers studying self-regulation. Examples of self-regulation are evident in the scene just described: Kpendule joining her mother as she empties the basket of food, taking a small amount of food from the communal bowl, and modulating her distress. Many researchers maintain that the development of self-regulatory processes involves a gradual shift from external to internal mechanisms of control, and they are interested in how this occurs and the consequences of it.

The first signs of children’s ability to self-regulate—to act appropriately on their own, by their own choosing, in a flexible and adaptive way—are evident in early childhood (Eisenberg, 2002; Grohnick, McMenemy, & Kurowski, 1999; Kopp, 2001). Early regulatory capacities lay the groundwork for later ones. Infants regulate their states of arousal in the first months of life, and how well they do this relates to their exploration and mastery of the environment at this age. As toddlers, children begin to develop social standards of control and compliance, and as young children they appropriate moral codes of conduct. These emergent regulatory abilities collectively support the young child’s developing sense of autonomy—a person with an “independent identity and self-sufficient behavior” (Calkins, Smith, Gill, & Johnson, 1998, p. 351). Contributing to these early accomplishments is the care children receive: “The movement towards autonomy and self-regulation is viewed as rooted in the quality of the earlier infant-caregiver relationship” (Sroufe, 1996, p. 204).

There is no unified literature on self-regulation. Rather, researchers typically examine emotional regulation or behavioral regulation, although some study both, and most acknowledge their interrelatedness (e.g., Calkins, 2004; Eisenberg, 2002; Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001; Stifter, Spinrad, & Braungart-Rieker, 1999). Investigators interested in emotional regulation rely on notions of temperament and, in particular, the constructs of effortful control (temperament that is managed voluntarily) and reactivity (fearfulness, impulsivity) (e.g., Rothbart, 1989; Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Investigators interested in behavioral self-regulation draw on self-determination theory. Yet these researchers concur that autonomy is a developmental goal and agree on the type of care that supports its development.

Regulation of Emotional Expressiveness

Theorists concerned with emotional development agree that emotion regulation is goal-
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directed and functional in nature (Eisenberg & Morris, 2002). Emotional regulation is evident early in the life of the child, and it is a central organizing construct, embedded in many other developments (Sroufe, 1979). At first, infants rely mostly on caregivers to manage their affective states (Thompson, 1994), but with time, infants assume more responsibility, and by early childhood, emotion regulation is largely self-initiated. Self-regulation theorists place great emphasis on this shift toward increased autonomy.

The quality of infants’ experiences with their caregivers is important to the development of emotional self-regulation. What matters is whether caregivers are sensitive and responsive, rejecting, or act unpredictably in response to infants’ emotional signals—especially during times of heightened arousal when infants are feeling threatened. Attachment theorists believe that infants develop a style of emotional expressiveness that best maintains their relationship with close others—a style that develops into strategies for regulating emotions (Cassidy, 1994). When infants are cared for in a sensitive and responsive manner, they learn that it is acceptable for them to express positive and negative emotions, and that seeking help from close others to regulate emotions is an effective strategy. Infants with this attachment history are likely to remain organized in the face of stress, to trust themselves to regulate their emotions, and to be open and flexible in their expression of emotions as they grow up. By comparison, infants with insecure attachment histories are less confident in expressing emotions or they express emotions inappropriately because of the unavailability or unpredictability of their care providers. As children, they are likely to mistrust themselves to regulate their emotion and they respond to stress in rigid or inefficient ways.

There is empirical support for this view. Children with insecure compared to secure attachment histories are more prone to express negative emotions as infants (distress and fearfulness) and are more aggressive as young children (Diener, Mangelsdorf, McHale, & Frosch, 2002; Grossman et al., 1999; Kochanska, 2001; Weinfield et al., 1999). Moreover, children with insecure attachment histories are more likely to remember negative events, whereas their agemates with secure histories are more likely to remember positive events (Belsky, Spritz, & Crnic, 1996). The expression of negative emotions, as well as the attention to negative events that is observed in children with insecure attachment histories, point to heightened negative emotionality.

Regulation of Behavior

Behavioral self-regulation rests on the development of accomplishments that occur around the second year of life, such as voluntary control and awareness of standards, along with an ability to evaluate and to adapt one’s actions accordingly (Kopp, 2001). One of the more well-studied examples of behavioral self-regulation is compliance to a caregiver’s request (Kochanska et al., 2001). Compliance is a heterogeneous construct entailing types that are motivationally distinct: committed and situational compliance (Kochanska et al., 2001). In committed compliance, the child wholeheartedly embraces the caregiver’s agenda and endorses it as his own; in situational compliance, the child does not embrace the caregiver’s agenda and his compliance is sustained by the caregiver’s control.

Eagerly embracing another’s agenda, the hallmark of committed compliance, indicates that the child experiences the action as personally endorsed and self-generated (Kochanska et al., 2001). This nascent sense of autonomy is important for the development of internalization and integration (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). By comparison, when a child does not experience a sense of control over the action, as is the case with situational compliance, the action is experienced as an externally controlled regulation, without being processed, coordinated, or endorsed by self (Ryan et al., 1997).

Regulation Strategies

How well children regulate their emotions and behaviors partly depends on their effortful control—the ability to “willfully or voluntarily inhibit, activate, or change (modulate) attention and behavior” (Eisenberg, Smith, Sadovsky, & Spinrad, 2004, p. 260). One measure of effortful control includes indices of attention shifting (or distraction). Infants and young children who use this strategy express less negative emotion (distress, anger; Bridges, Grolnick, & Connell, 1997; Calkins & Johnson, 1998; Grolnick, Bridges, & Connell, 1996; Tronick, 1989) and are able to delay gratification longer (Eisenberg et al., 2004).
than peers using other self-regulatory strategies.

Using a composite measure of effortful control that included an assessment of attentional control, Kochanska, Murray, and Harlan (2000) found that higher effortful control at 22 months predicted better regulation of anger (during frustrating situations) at 22 and 33 months, and joy (during pleasurable situations) at 33 months. Effortful control is also positively related to young children’s committed compliance and to aspects of moral development associated with it, and negatively related to externalizing behaviors in early school-age children (Kochanska, 2001; Kochanska et al., 2001; Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 1997).

Whereas shifting attention is considered one of the more adaptive self-regulation strategies, moving closer to or making contact with an adult, or waiting for a person to intervene, are examples of less adaptive self-regulation strategies, especially for older children. As children get older, there should be a “greater reliance on solitary or intrapersonal strategies of regulation/control” (Eisenberg & Morris, 2002, p. 199). These two classes of strategies represent the ends of an autonomy continuum from self-reliant and active to stimulus-bound and passive (Grolnick et al., 1999). A particularly important aspect of autonomous regulation is the ability to use strategies flexibly depending on the context. A child who is able to do this is able to “experience emotions over a range of intensities without the feeling of being out of control” (Bridges & Grolnick, 1995, p. 205).

The type of care that fosters adaptive self-regulatory abilities also fosters healthy attachment relationships. This care is supportive, warm, sensitive, responsive, nonintrusive (asking if the child needs help, making suggestions, offering explanations), and emotionally positive. In contrast is care that is intrusive, directive (telling the child what to do or physically making the child do something), and emotionally negative (angry, hostile, demeaning). Young children whose mothers are involved with them in positive ways are more likely to rely on adaptive regulation strategies, are less distressed in situations meant to elicit negative emotions, show more committed compliance, and score higher on measures of conscience than are children with mothers who are less positive and supportive of them (e.g., Calkins & Johnson, 1998; Feldman, Greenbaum, & Yirmiya, 1999; Kochanska & Murray, 2000; Silverman & Ippolito, 1993).

Scholars provide many reasons why positive care fosters adaptive regulatory abilities and the competencies associated with them, but what is basic to all is the view that this type of parenting is a minimal threat to the child’s autonomy and in fact supports its development. Often cited is the explanation that sensitive care provides children with varied opportunities to observe and practice valued ways of regulating emotions and behavior on their own, with a sense of self-discovery and self-confidence. By contrast, care that thwarts children’s autonomous functioning deprives them of the feeling that they have a say in things—a sense of choice and control that comes when children are able to mobilize resources they want (when others respond to their bids and follow their lead). What contributes to these feelings of choice and control is parents who are willing to negotiate or share power with their child (Crockenberg & Litman, 1990).

Our discussion of healthy attachment relationships and adaptive self-regulation says a lot about valued ways of being a person in middle-class U.S. and Western European communities. Attachment relationships and self-regulation are conceptualized in ways that make sense given the values of the people most often studied and of the researchers who most often study them. However, other ways of being a person in the world reflect ethics besides autonomy, such as ethics of community (duty, hierarchy) and divinity (sacred order, natural order) (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), and this raises questions about the appropriateness of Western-based notions of healthy development for people who live by these ethics. We now consider the self more broadly than how it is portrayed by the theories and research we reviewed earlier, examining “the way culture, community, and psyche become coordinated and make each other possible” (Shweder et al., 2000, p. 868). We then consider attachment relationships and self-regulation from this perspective.

**MULTIPLE SELFWAYS—MULTIPLE DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS**

The self determines what a person notices, thinks about, feels, and remembers; how and why a person relates to others; what it means to be an acceptable, good, and moral person; and how a person organizes, interprets, and makes sense of experiences. This means that
the experience and expression of self is integral to psychological processes such as attachment and self-regulation. The self develops as infants and children take part in the day-to-day life of their community—in culturally organized practices, routines, and traditions that provide opportunities to develop valued ways of being a person in the world (Rogoff, 1990). Cultural practices and contexts are one side of a “two-sided thing” (Shweder et al., 2000, p. 874), the other side is the mentalities associated with them. Mentalities are what we know, want, feel, value, and believe. They give form and meaning to practices and are reflected in them.

An Efe example illustrates how practices and mentalities relate, and how community members foster the development of similarly minded infants and children. As soon as infants are able to toddle, around 8 or 9 months of age, they are asked to carry bits of food and other delectable items to different camp members. When the infant places the item in the person’s hand, the person immediately places it back in the infant’s hand and asks the infant to return it to the person who sent it, or to give it to someone else. It is not unusual for this to go on for awhile and everyone seems to enjoy it. Infants are engaged in this “game” until they are about a year old. When asked about this routine, camp members say that it is important for children to learn when they are young the value and practice of sharing, particularly when this means giving away desirable items to the people with whom they live. Sharing is critical to the survival of the Efe: People must depend on each other for many things, especially food, because the success of a hunt or a gathering expedition is never guaranteed. But sharing is more than this: It connects people to one another, making public, confirming, and authenticating social relationships; it is a way to express affection, friendship, and good will.

Ways of being a person in the world are culturally and historically grounded and at the same time personal: personal because of the peculiarities of an individual’s experiences; cultural because people of a community participate in a system of practices and beliefs that foster a shared understanding of valued ways of acting, feeling, and thinking; and historical because cultural practices and beliefs are “passed down” from one generation to the next. Generational transmission is not a passive process. Individuals reproduce, as well as produce, aspects of culture, which is as dynamic as the people who constitute and are constituted by them. Markus, Mullally, and Kitayama (1997) refer to “self” and “selfway” to distinguish between the personal and cultural-historical aspects of self (although this distinction does not imply that these aspects of self are divisible). Selfway is a characteristic way of being a person in the world that develops because of the culturally mediated experiences people of a community have in common. Self is the personalization of this characteristic way.

The relation between self and selfway is nicely illustrated in a conversation one of us had with a U.S. middle-class mother of European descent who was asked to tell us where her young infant slept and why (Morelli, Rogoff, Oppenheimer, & Goldsmith, 1992). She hesitated at first, then told me that her 1-year-old son sleeps with himself and her husband. She laughed awkwardly and quickly added that no one knew this, especially her mother, who would have been very upset had she known. This mother decided not to participate in a practice common to people like herself and promoted by experts in the field. Still, she was aware of what was expected of her, and her resistance to the practice of sleeping in a bed (and even a room) separate from her infant was a source of concern.

**Cultural Patterning of Selfways and Self**

Two well-researched selfways, independence and interdependence, were once considered to be opposites. The former emphasizes autonomy (internal control, individual choice, personal agency) and the latter, heteronomy (conformity, obligation, reciprocity, and loyalty). However, for all of us, agency, choice, loyalty, and obligation are important in certain situations at certain times in our lives. As researchers acknowledged this, it began to make less sense to think of selfways in dichotomous ways. The revision in thinking, and the research that led to it, suggests that individuals develop heterogeneous orientations—with different emphases on independent and interdependent orientations in different contexts (e.g., Shweder et al., 2000). But how these qualities are experienced and expressed by people relate to the culture’s predominant value system: “Although independence and interdependence are viewed as dimensions of functioning in any culture, they are expected to take on different meanings when they are part of different cultural value systems” (Raeff, 1997, pp. 212–
Autonomy is the ethic that underlies the independent self-way and North Americans' and Western Europeans' views of the self. What these people notice, how they make sense of it, and what they act as a result are likely to rest more on their perceived personal qualities, such as traits, attributes, and talents, than on situational or relational qualities. These personal qualities are the defining feature of self for this self-way and are the source of self-knowledge (Suh, 2000). Reference to and affirmation of these qualities, which promote a tendency toward self-expression and self-enhancement, are likely to support the self-determining attitude required for being a valued person (Shweder et al., 2000).

People living elsewhere rely on different ethics to justify their way of being. The ethics of community prevalent in many East Asian societies places great value on virtues such as respect, duty, and obligation, privileges situational and interpersonal qualities, and underlies the interdependent self-way. What is important to this self is the self-in-context, especially the interpersonal context. For example, Miller (1984) observed that older Indian children relied more on contextual factors to explain social situations, whereas older children in the United States relied more on individual, stable, personality traits. Ip and Bond (1995) found that Chinese participants referred more often to social roles when describing themselves than did North American participants. And Japanese students were twice as likely as European American students to include other people in their self-descriptions (50% compared to 24%) (Markus et al., 1997). People in communities with this ethic prioritize harmonious connections, which require knowing and meeting the expectations of others (Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984a). Expressions of self-criticism and the need for self-improvement make possible this moral good, as do acts to fit in socially (Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984b). Self-expansive actions, of which expressions of happiness are an example (Kitayama, Karasawa, & Mesquita, 2004), and acts that call attention to self or emphasize the distinct and uniqueness of self, threaten harmony.

The ethics by which people live relate not only to how competencies are defined but also to how they develop. Keller and colleagues postulated that competencies such as healthy attachment and adaptive self-regulation develop along one of two developmental pathways (Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003; Keller, 2003). They proposed a component model of parenting made up of different parenting systems, including body contact, body stimulation, object stimulation, and face-to-face exchange. The way practices relate within and across systems suggest two parenting styles. The proximal style emphasizes bodily closeness, and the distal style emphasizes physical separateness and distance. These styles are related respectively to the development of an interdependent and independent self-way (Keller, Lohaus, Volker, Cappenberg, & Chasiotis, 2004; Rothbaum & Trommsdorff, 2006). Another formulation of developmental pathways is provided by Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, and Weisz (2000), who suggest that close relationships in Japan are characterized by efforts to achieve "symbiotic harmony," and that relationships in the United States are characterized by efforts to achieve "generative tension." Rather than depicting these cultures as differing in their investment in relationships, they review evidence suggesting that they differ in the meaning and dynamics of relationships.

We now consider young children's attachment relationships and self-regulation growing up in societies where ethics like community are important. In doing so, we revisit the thesis that healthy development inevitably involves internalization and integration (internal cohesion) that are critical to autonomous functioning. We proceed cautiously, however, because the cultures we refer to as living by ethics of community differ in how this ethic is experienced and expressed in everyday life, as do cultures living by ethics of autonomy.

BROADENING OUR THINKING ABOUT ATTACHMENT RELATIONSHIPS

We begin by asking whether our understanding of attachment relationships changes when we include in our theories people whose way of being a person are rooted in ethics of community or divinity—where what they notice, feel, think about, and remember are motivated by situational and interpersonal considerations more often than not. We accept the challenge implied by LeVine and Norman (2001) when they said,
“The study of attachment . . . gave rise to an approach as blind to culture as any other in psychology” (p. 86). Below, we reexamine central tenets of attachment theory, this time considering research in communities where autonomy is not as central a concern.

Our thesis goes beyond suggesting that culturally informed research just consider the possibility that the circumstances of a child’s life, including cultural circumstances, relate only to the quality of the attachment relationship. Rather, it must also consider the very premises underlying traditional attachment theory. We posit that the very essence—the very meaning—of attachment relationships is related to ethics by which people live. Among people living by ethics of community, attachment relationships are based more on goals involving interdependence—harmony, duty, and obligation. Accordingly, the attachment system is more undermined by inability to depend on and fit in with others than on inability to gain autonomy. The care experiences that foster this type of attachment relationship and related competence are also fundamentally different (Rothbaum, Weisz, Pott, Miyake, & Morelli, 2000).

The Secure Base from Which to Explore and Security of Attachment Relationships

At the heart of the notion of attachment security is the concept of a secure base. “For both Bowlby and Ainsworth, to be attached is to use someone preferentially as a secure base from which to explore” (Waters & Cummings, 2000, p. 165). We maintain that attachment theorists’ conceptualization of the secure base reflects the Western emphasis on exploration and the belief that exploration leads to an independent self. As noted by Seifer and Schiller (1995), “Secure base behavior provides a context in which differentiation of self and other can take place” (p. 149). Japanese attachment experts are less likely to emphasize a dynamic that is so centered on individuation. According to Takahashi (1990, p. 29), “Mothers’ effectiveness in serving a secure base function well represents the quality of attachment only in the American culture, in which social independence or self-reliance is emphasized.”

Few studies have adopted emic or derived etic methods (culturally sensitive measures) when examining the nature of security in non-Western (“majority world”) cultures. To our knowledge, only Harwood, Miller, and Irizarry (1995) have used open-ended methods to explore indigenous concepts pertaining to the nature of the secure base. These investigators focused on the key attachment theory concept of optimal balance (alternating between exploration/autonomy and attachment/relatedness). They found that “Puerto Rican mothers conceptualized optimal balance in terms of . . . a contextually appropriate balancing of calm, respectful attentiveness with positive engagement in interpersonal relationships [rather than] . . . in terms of autonomy and relatedness” (p. 112). As expected, the balance of autonomy and relatedness was the primary theme emerging from the interviews with the Anglo mothers.

In summarizing their findings, Harwood and colleagues (1995) comment: “The construct of security versus insecurity has become equated in U.S. psychology with a host of culturally valued qualities that are specific to the socialization goals of our highly individualistic society, thus limiting their cross cultural meaningfulness” (p. 114). This captures well our concerns about current conceptualizations of security—that they are grounded in independent ways of being and the emphasis on autonomy. In Puerto Rico, people live by ethics of community and are relatively more concerned with respect, duty, and obligation. For them, attachment has more to do with awareness of persons and situations in which these values must be exhibited.

Observations of infants in different cultures suggest that there may be a biological basis to the link between attachment and exploration (Van Ijzendoorn & Sagi, 1999). However, the extent to which exploration occurs, and the primacy of the link between attachment and exploration, varies across cultures. Japanese babies have repeatedly been observed to engage in less exploratory activity than U.S. babies, including in the Strange Situation (reviewed in Rothbaum, Weiss, Pott, Miyake, & Morelli, 2000). Moreover, whereas Japanese babies are more oriented to their mothers in circumstances involving both distress and positive emotions, U.S. infants are more oriented to the environment in such circumstances (Bornstein, Azuma, Tamis-LeMonda, & Ogino, 1990; Friedlmeier & Trommsdorff, 1999).

Whereas the link between attachment and exploration behavioral systems is seen as primary in many middle-class U.S. and Western
European communities, the link between the attachment and dependence behavioral systems appears primary in majority world communities, including Japan and Puerto Rico. Just as exploration during infancy fosters ethics of autonomy, dependence fosters ethics of community. In Japan there is a greater emphasis on accommodation or “social fittedness” (Emde, 1992) and related qualities including empathy with others, compliance with their wishes, and responsiveness to social cues and norms. Support for our view of attachment in the life of Japanese children comes from the study of amae, an indigenous Japanese concept that refers to relationships involving both attachment and dependence (Doi, 1989; Emde, 1992; Okonogi, 1992). According to Doi (1992) amae means “to depend and presume upon another’s love or bask in another’s indulgence” (p. 8); amae is “what an infant feels when seeking his or her mother.” The parallels between amae and attachment in their developmental course, antecedents, consequences, and role in adaptation (Emde, 1992; Okonogi, 1992; Rothbaum, Kakinuma, Nagaoka, & Azuma, 2005), led Doi to conclude: “The concept of attachment which was introduced by John Bowlby . . . obviously covers the same area as amae” (1989, p. 350).

The view that amae is an attachment-related construct for relationships in Japan is supported by research that uses a modified separation–reunion paradigm with preschool children (Mizuta, Zahn-Waxler, Cole, & Hiruma, 1996). Mothers and their children were observed during preseparation and reunion episodes for attachment (e.g., proximity, anxiety, and avoidance) and amae-related behaviors (e.g., dependence). The emotion language mothers and children used when talking about past separations and reunions was noted as well. The researchers observed that compared to U.S. children, Japanese children exhibited more dependent behavior characteristic of amae when reunited with their mothers; following the reunion, Japanese mothers and their children expressed more feelings of sadness due to separation (presumably related to interpersonal loss) and less feelings of fear (presumably related to perceived danger) than their U.S. counterparts. Mizuta and colleagues speculated that, for the Japanese children, attachment has more to do with meeting amae needs (for indulgence and interdependence) than meeting needs for autonomy and exploration.

Whereas separation activates the attachment system in both cultures, activation is associated with threats to very different needs. Japanese children’s amae behaviors on reunion signaled their perception that their needs for indulgence and interdependence were threatened, and Japanese mothers responded to them by engaging their amae-related behaviors (providing proximal reassurances), presumably to reaffirm the relationship. Amae, the authors conclude, “may be an appropriate means of deactivating an attachment system aroused by interpersonal loss more than exploratory risk” (p. 156). Findings with adults also indicate a closer link between attachment and amae in Japan than in the United States (Kondo-Ikemura & Matsuoka, 1999).

These cultural differences in views regarding children’s relationships may relate to the higher levels of “insecure-ambivalent” babies and lower levels of “insecure-avoidant” babies in Japan than in the United States (Van IJzendoorn & Sagi, 1999). There are many similarities between descriptions of insecure-ambivalent behaviors and behaviors widely regarded as adaptive in Japan, including exaggerated cute and babyish behaviors (Main & Cassidy, 1988), extreme expressions of need for care and attention, extensive clinging and proximity seeking, helpless dependency (Cassidy & Berlin, 1994), extreme passivity, blurring of boundaries between self and other (Weinfeld et al., 1999), and failure to engage in exploration (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Many of these features of ambivalent behavior characterize the normal amae relationship in Japan (Doi, 1973; Kondo-Ikemura & Matsuoka, 1999; Lebra, 1994; Mizuta et al., 1996).

S sensitive Care and Security of Attachment Relationships?

Carlson and Harwood (2003) found that, as predicted, mothers’ physical control related to insecure attachment in Anglo American families, but not in Puerto Rican families: “The highest ratings of physical control were associated with secure 12-month attachment status for these middle-class Puerto Rican dyads. This apparently paradoxical finding highlights the need for culturally specific definitions of sensitive caregiving” (p. 17). These findings stand in stark contrast to Western findings, reviewed earlier, that responsive, nonintrusive, autonomy-fostering maternal practices hold
the key to secure attachment. According to Carlson and Harwood, physical control is part of a larger system of practices and beliefs among Puerto Rican mothers. “Teaching infants to be attentive, calm, and well behaved requires considerably more physical prompting and control than teaching infants to be assertive and self-confident. Thus it appears that maternal use of physical control may be regulated by maternal socialization goals” (p. 18).

Interestingly, parental control, directiveness, and strictness are more valued and emphasized in many cultural and ethnic communities—African American, Korean, Chinese, and Iranian—than they are among European Americans (Carlson & Harwood, 2003). Members of all of these groups subscribe to a selfway that emphasizes the importance of accommodating oneself to the needs of others and to situational demands, and seeking harmony with others. Children who have experienced controlling caregiving are more likely to find security in relationships characterized by clearly prescribed role expectations, where their own and their partner’s accommodation will cement close ties. Future research may show an association between parental control and security in all of these cultural groups. By contrast, Western attachment theorists maintain that efforts to physically control, shape, or interfere with infants’ activity are associated with insensitivity and insecurity. The link between autonomy fostering and security—which is assumed to be universal by attachment theorists (Allen & Land, 1999; Belsky, Rosenberger, & Crnic, 1995)—may be a predominantly Western phenomenon (cf. Dennis, Cole, Zahn-Waxler, & Mizuta, 2002).

Cultural studies suggest as well that the timing of caregivers’ response to babies’ signals may not be the same across cultures. Western investigators evaluate caregiver’s behavior in terms of its responsiveness—how contingent the response is (immediately after) to the child’s overt signal. By contrast, studies in other cultures emphasize the ways caregivers anticipate shifts in a baby’s emotional state and respond proactively (or respond to very subtle and covert signals). Anticipatory responsiveness is reported among the Japanese (Rothbaum, Nagoaka, & Ponte, 2005; Trommsdorff & Friedelmeier, 2003), the Nso of Cameroon (Voelker, Yovsi, & Keller, 1998), and Puerto Ricans and Central American immigrants in the United States (Harwood, 1992). Underlying U.S. caregivers’ reliance on responsiveness is their emphasis on children’s autonomy, children’s responsibility for clarifying their needs, and the value of children’s explicit signals. Underlying Japanese caregivers’ reliance on anticipation is their emphasis on children’s dependence on others, caregivers’ responsibility for clarifying children’s needs, and the value of caregivers’ assumptions about children’s needs (Rothbaum et al., 2005).

Cultural differences in proactive compared to reactive responses to babies’ signals may reflect prioritization of selfways emphasizing harmony and context-embeddedness versus autonomy and individuation (Keller et al., 2003). Proactive caregiving may pave the way for attachment relationships that emphasize interdependence, extreme empathy, merger of self and other, and heightened attentiveness and sensitivity to situational demands.

**Competence and Attachment Relationships?**

Just as there are differences in the nature of security and practices fostering it, there are differences in competencies that follow from security. Attachment theorists emphasize Western values and behaviors associated with autonomy, including exploration, self-assertion, self-esteem, and independence. By contrast, “from [an East Asian] perspective, an assertive, autonomous . . . person is immature and uncultivated” (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998, p. 923).

Other investigators also highlight cultural differences in conceptions of competence. Keller (2003) notes that Western-based ideas of competence—which emphasize individual ability, cultivation of the individual mind, exploration, discovery, and personal achievement—are fundamentally different from conceptions seen in many other societies, such as the Baoule of the Ivory Coast, A-Chew of Zambia, Nso of Cameroon, Cree of Alaska, Hindu of India, and Chinese of mainland China and Taiwan. In these majority world societies, competence is considered “as moral self-cultivation, a social contribution, discouraging individual celebration of achievement . . . [and] as communal achievements, including the ability to maintain social harmony implying social respect and acceptance of social roles” (p. 289).

Other cultural studies support Keller’s view. In their conversations with mothers, Harwood et al. (1995) found that Anglo mothers’ views
of social competence centered on self-
maximization and independence, as seen in
their emphasis on autonomy, happiness, con-
dience, and exploration. For Puerto Rican
mothers, social competence involved "pro-
per demeanor" and interdependence, as seen in
their emphasis on respect, obedience, calmness,
politeness, gentleness, and kindness. "Pro-
per demeanor" refers to more than appropriate
ways of relating to others; it also refers to what
is described in English as "teachable." It in-
volves a receptivity to one's elders "in order to
become skilled in the interpersonal and rhetori-
cal competencies that will someday be expected
of the well-socialized adult" (p. 98). If attach-
ment research had its origins in non-Western
cultures, we suspect that qualities such as
proper demeanor (and sunao—a similar Japa-
nese construct) would be considered universal
consequences of security.

BROADENING OUR THINKING
ABOUT SELF-REGULATION

Eisenberg and Zhou (2000) raise the possibility
that "people in individualistic and collective
cultures differ in their standards for emotion
regulation, beliefs and values regarding an op-
timal state, or attention to and perception of
their own emotional state" (p. 169). We elabo-
rate on this observation, examining self-
regulation mostly in African and East and
Southeast Asian communities. For these peo-
ple, the self in self-regulation is less concerned
with internal attributes and qualities and more
concerned with situational circumstances.
Adaptive self-regulation in these communities,
like healthy, close relationships, more often in-
cludes efforts to achieve relational harmony
than personal autonomy. Regulatory processes
reflect a heightened concern with interpersonal
contexts (self-presentation to gain acceptance)
compared to personal contexts (delay of grati-
fication when alone). Because of this, they are
likely to differ in form, function, meaning, and
circumstances of occurrence.

Self-Regulation of Emotions and Behavior

When people live by ethics of autonomy, emo-
tional expressiveness9 often draws attention to
their inner qualities and attributes. These emo-
tions cover the gamut from positive to nega-
tive, including frustration and anger. Positive
emotions are perhaps the most desirable be-
cause they foster and protect personal esteem,
which sustains the autonomous self (Mesquita,
2003). This is not like the emotional expression
of people for whom community is paramount.
For them, socially engaging emotions that bind
people together (e.g., empathy and shame) are
valued. Positive emotions are valued by people
who live by ethics of community when they
foster and strengthen social ties, as seen in
many Asian societies, for example (Kitayama,
Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000). Ego-based, so-
cially disengaging emotions that disrupt har-
mony, such as anger, frustration, and pride, are
seen negatively (Kitayama et al., 2004; Markus
& Kitayama, 1991). These people have a
heightened awareness of their audience's expec-
tations, and regulatory processes are attuned to
situational cues and reflect more consideration
of social norms than of personal attitudes and
beliefs (Kitayama & Markus, 1999). Adaptive
self-regulation leads to responsive coordination
with others and, ultimately, relational har-
mony.

There is evidence to support this view. Japa-
nese students and community members were
asked what they would do if offended by an-
other person. Common answers included doing
nothing, taking responsibility for the offense,
and seeking closeness to the offender, all of
which reflect concerns about relational har-
mony and efforts to repair the relationship. By
comparison, American students were more
likely to blame the offender (69%)—a disen-
gaging response (Mesquita, Karasawa, Haire,
Japanese students also said that they experi-
ence more interpersonally engaged emotions in
everyday social situations and generally felt
more positive when they did; the valence of the
emotion (whether shame or empathy) mattered
less to them. By comparison, North Ameri-
can students preferred positive emotions—
emotional valence was key—and were gener-
ally more positive when experiencing interper-
sonally disengaged emotions (those reflecting
independence).

Even at young ages, children's experience
and expression of emotions are consistent with
the ethics of the society in which they live.
Among Indonesians, the expression of negative
emotions is infrequent, but when they are ex-
pressed, young children's healthy functioning is
compromised. Third-grade Indonesian children
are likely to respond to family members' rela-
tively nonhostile, low-key negative emotions
with poorer performance on measures of self-
regulation (attentional control and inhibitory control), sympathy, and externalizing behaviors, according to their parents. Family members' expression of positive emotions, however, was not related to children's enhanced functioning, unlike what is often observed in the United States (Eisenberg, Liew, & Pidada, 2001). Compared to North American preschoolers, Japanese preschoolers responded to hypothetical emotionally challenging situations (involving interpersonal conflict and distress) with fewer references to anger and aggression, highlighting Japanese children's desire not to harm others (Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, Cole, Mizuta, & Hiruma, 1996). When asked what they would do in the situation, North American, but not Japanese, preschoolers said they would avoid the person involved—a disengaging strategy.

Emotional regulation sometimes takes place at the level of appraisal (what a person notices and attends to), minimizing expressions of disruptive emotions. We see this among the Utku Inuits (Briggs, 1970), Tahitians (Levy, 1973), and Nepali Tamang (Cole & Tamang, 1998). Six- to 9-year-old Tamang children participating in a study similar to the one by Zahn-Waxler and colleagues (1996) just described reported feeling “okay” when asked about these emotionally challenging situations. Their responses suggested that the situations were not appraised as emotionally significant to them, which is consistent with the peaceful and calm demeanor valued by the Tamang. By contrast, for the Chhetri-Brahmin children participating in this study, regulation took place at the level of expression. Although these children consistently reported feelings of anger in these situations, they said that they would mask their emotion so others would not know about them (show no facial signs of the felt emotion).

Children living in other East Asian and Southeast Asian communities such as Korea, China, and Thailand, are often described as overregulated in their emotional expressions compared to their North American agemates. Chen and her colleagues (1998) found that Chinese 2-year-olds scored higher on measures of behavioral inhibition in their reaction to a scary object in a laboratory situation than did Canadian toddlers. Almost half of the Chinese children did not even touch the object (47%), whereas most Canadian toddlers did (88%). The shyer (behaviorally inhibited) the Chinese child, the more likely was his mother to express warm and accepting attitudes toward him, which was untrue of Canadian mothers of shy children.

Historically, shyness among the Chinese was considered mature and sensitive, unlike expressiveness, which was regarded as nonadaptive and immature regulation (Ho, 1986). Shy children fared well in terms of peer acceptance, leadership, and academic achievement (Chen, Cen, Li, & He, 2005; Chen et al., 2003). By contrast, shy North American children do not fare well; they are more prone to internalizing problems such as social withdrawal and depression (Eisenberg, 2002), are regarded as socially inept or immature, and have poor peer relations (Eisenberg & Zhou, 2000). However, today in China, the shy child is doing less well. Chen et al. (2005) examined measures of elementary school-age children's social and academic functioning, including shyness, at three different points in time—1990, 1998, and 2002. Whereas shyness in the 1990 cohort was associated with positive outcomes like those just noted, in the 2002 cohort it was not. Rather, shyness was correlated with peer rejection, school problems, and depression. Shyness, once traditionally valued and encouraged, is now seen as an impediment to developing qualities, such as social assertion and initiative, that many consider necessary for success in China’s increasingly capitalistic system.

The emotion of feeling-with-others, or empathy, is important for connecting people with one another (Saarni, 1997); in fact, it may be considered the quintessential interpersonally engaging emotion. Empathetic-related responses take into account, and accommodate to, the needs of the other in appropriate, prosocial ways (Roberts & Strayer, 1996). In Japan, empathy helps a person “avoid inconveniencing, annoying, or imposing on others” (Clancy, 1986, pp. 233–234). Japanese mothers consider empathy, as well as obedience and good manners, a self-regulatory function that increases with the age of the child (Rothbaum, Kakinuma, et al., 2005; Kashiiwagi, 1988, cited in Ujije, 1997).

Placing the burden of understanding people’s needs and intentions on the listener may support the development of empathy and, more broadly, the sensitivity and responsiveness to others that are important to the regulatory processes maintaining relational harmony. A good listener must notice and attend to the speaker and other relevant situational cues to intuit what another has on his or her mind. Japanese mothers help children learn this competency by
telling them directly what others are thinking and feeling in various situations (Clancy, 1986). Similarly, among the Kaluli of New Guinea, mothers speak for their babies, teaching them what to say in social situations (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984).

In many U.S. middle-class families, by comparison, the speaker rather than the listener is responsible for effective communication. The speaker must make himself heard and understood—regulating the volume, animation, and persistence of the messages to make it clear what he is trying to say. An example of U.S. children’s responsibilities as speakers is observed in a study where European American middle-class mothers and Efe mothers were asked to show their child how to work a difficult toy, then asked to shift their attention from their child to the researcher to answer some questions (Morelli, Verhoeff, & Anderson, 1996). Representative of the U.S. children was Sara, who marched back and forth, breaking the line of vision between her mother and the researcher, chanting “Look at me, look at me.” Finally Sara grabbed her mother’s face in her hands, turned it toward her face and yelled, “Look at me!” This child was responsible for regulating her expressiveness to communicate her needs and did so using overt actions and distal verbal strategies. The Efe children depend more on relatively subtle behaviors, such as increased proximity, gentle touch, and postural shifts that relied on their mothers to make sense of their needs, and that did not disrupt the flow of adult activity (see also Rogoff, Mistry, Goncu, & Mosier, 1993).

Empathic expressiveness is an important element of social relations for people everywhere. Two-year-old German and Japanese girls expressed comparable levels of empathy (when one’s own emotional reaction is congruent with the emotional reaction of the other) in a situation designed to elicit this emotion—when a playmate (stranger) expressed sadness over a broken toy (Trommsdorff, 1995). However, compared to the German girls, the Japanese girls were more distressed (upset, anxious, uneasy) by their playmate’s sadness and were less likely to recover from it (stayed tense) even though their mothers were as likely to respond contingently to their distress (Friedlmair & Trommsdorff, 1999). By Western standards the distress reaction of the Japanese girls would represent difficulty in adaptively regulating empathy, leading to overarousal, which is considered aversive and is thought to promote a concern about one’s self at the expense of a concern for others (Eisenberg, Smith, et al., 2004). This was true for the German girls; for the Japanese girls, feelings of empathy-related distress did not interfere with their ability to act in a prosocial manner toward the playmate (Trommsdorff & Kornadt, 2003). In other contexts, distress may cause Japanese children to focus on themselves, but distress in empathetic contexts seems to be associated with increased concern for others.

In this study, the Japanese girls were more likely to regulate their distress by seeking physical closeness with their mothers than were the German girls, who were more likely to use eye contact. Unlike the German girls, the Japanese girls did not approach the playmate; they remained close to their mothers, leaving it up to the playmate to approach them. Similarly, young Chinese children stayed closer to their mothers in novel situations meant to elicit stress than did Canadian children (Chen et al., 1998). Physical proximity as a regulation strategy is considered immature by Westerners; however, it is more compatible with people concerned with relational harmony, and it is consistent with many other aspects of care—such as co-sleeping, co-bathing, and prolonged periods of holding—that maximize proximity. Heightened proximity is likely accompanied by lower levels of autonomy (Rothbaum & Trommsdorff, 2006). Distal forms of closeness such as eye-to-eye contact by comparison are more compatible with autonomous self-regulation, which in the West is a hallmark of maturity.

Fitting in, rather than standing out, is important as well to relational harmony (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). The practice of self-criticism is one way to achieve fit. Self-criticism shows that a person is aware of her shortcomings and is willing to improve on them (Mesquita, 2003; Shwedewer et al., 2000). This involves sensitivity to the expectations of others and to the demands of the situation (e.g., see Chao, 1992). We see signs of self-criticism in East Asian children starting at an early age. Stigler, Smith, and Mau (1985) found that Chinese elementary school students rated their competence in the cognitive, physical, and general domains lower than did their North American agemates. In school, Japanese children are given time to reflect on what was not done to meet idealized standards and to consider ways to improve in the future (Heine, Markus, Lehman, & Kitayama, 1999). Among the Chinese, mothers speak of themselves as more re-
jecting and less accepting of their children than do Canadian mothers (Chen et al., 1998), and they use storytelling to talk about their children's transgressions in ways that are highly critical of the child (P. J. Miller, Fung, & Mintz, 1996). Similarly, Korean parents make clear that their children do not fulfill their hopes (Markus et al., 1997).

Self-discipline in the form of perseverance and endurance makes it possible for East Asian children to strive to meet the expectations of others. The Koreans have a term—sugohaseyo—that captures this ethos: "No matter how hard you work, you can always work harder" (Grant & Dweck, 2001, p. 207). Tobin, Wu, and Davidson (1989) describe a scene in which Chinese preschoolers, working silently for 20 minutes, build, tear down piece by piece, and rebuild structures exactly as they appear in a picture. This attention to order and regimentation is seen as an important part of children's learning self-regulation, discipline, and social harmony. But one U.S. preschool teacher remarked, upon viewing a videotape of these children, "I guess what bothers me most is that there is such an overemphasis on order and on behaving properly at the cost of stamping out the children's creativity . . . instead of [allowing them] to play in a natural, imaginative way" (p. 92). In the West, this type of persistence would probably not be characterized as adaptive self-regulation, because it does not appear to be autonomous and flexible.

Because of their emphasis on self-improvement, many East Asians attribute their achievements to effort rather than ability. For example, fifth-grade Korean children were more likely to say that they would work harder if they experienced an academic setback than were their North American agemates (Grant & Dweck, 2001). This is consistent with the Japanese notion of "becoming better" (Heine et al., 1999, p. 771). When a person's efforts are not enough to meet the expectations of others, he is likely to experience great distress—high self-blame and negative affect—in part because he is acutely aware of and sensitive to other's opinion of him, and his failures reflect poorly on close others. Unlike Western standards, this distress would not be seen as a failure to self-regulate adaptively, because it motivates children to persevere in their attempts toward self-improvement (Chang, 2001).

East Asian and African adults' encouragement of compliance further indicates that they link self-regulation with relational harmony. Japanese mothers cajole their children into complying by relying on appeals to empathy (how they are hurt by the situation), social disapproval, and withdrawal of attention by ignoring the child. Clancy (1986) describes a Japanese mother coaxing a child to do what she was told by offering to help the child, doing it along with the child, or watching as the child performed the assigned task. U.S. parents, in comparison, use ego-enhancing strategies such as praise, encouragement, and reference to the child's accomplishments to motivate children to do what they are told (see review by Abe & Izard, 1999; see also Dennis et al., 2002).

Japanese adults tend not to view children's resistance to requests as establishing personal boundaries or seeking autonomy, but rather as selfishness and egocentrism (Yamada, 2004) or as a sign of the child's immaturity: "He is only a child, he'll have time to brush his teeth when he is older" (Osterweil & Nagano, 1991, p. 369). This does not mean that Japanese parents are less tolerant of children's resistance; rather, they attribute it less to needs for autonomy and more to needs for maturity (Lebra, 1994). In several African communities, noncompliance is considered a moral transgression (Nsamenang, 1992). In middle-class U.S. communities, however, noncompliance is sometimes considered a sign that the child is acting autonomously. Older children are seen as showing more mature forms of noncompliance such as bargaining and negotiation, and mothers' responses to their children's noncompliance changes accordingly (Kuczynski, Kochanska, Radke-Yarrow, & Girmius-Brown, 1987). Mothers of children using these more mature noncompliance strategies are more likely to countermand by reasoning and counternegotiation. Ujiie (1997) notes that U.S. parents' encouragement of the child not to comply with seemingly unfair requests—which he calls assertive autonomy—is difficult for many Japanese to understand or accept, because this goes against the virtue of adjusting one's needs to the needs of the group. Ujiie notes that Japanese comments such as "He is assertive" or "He has a self" are typically pejorative.

Developmental Pathway to Interdependent Self-Regulation

Keller, Yovsi, et al. (2004) explored the premise that East Asian and African children's early care experiences underlie the development of self-regulatory processes that reflect heightened
concerns with relational harmony. They examined the maternal correlates of infants’ and toddlers’ self-regulation in communities differing in their emphasis on autonomy and community—the Nso of Cameroon (representative of an interdependent cultural pathway) and Greek infants of Greece (representative of an independent cultural pathway). They identified two styles of parenting associated with these different ethics (Keller, Lohaus, et al., 1999) and argued that the distal style, with its emphasis on face-to-face contact and object play, was more likely to foster in children a concern with issues of personal autonomy and separateness; the proximal style, with its emphasis on bodily closeness, in contrast, was more likely to foster in children a concern with issues of heteronomy and relatedness.

Keller, Yovsi, et al. (2004) reasoned as well that the timing of accomplishments such as self-regulation (e.g., committed compliance) and self-recognition would depend in part on the importance of the ethics by which people lived. Compliance is extremely important among many East Asians and Africans; the press for early compliance is noted in the Gusii of Kenya (LeVine, 2004), the Efe of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Morelli, 1997), among children living in Nyansongo in Kenya, and among the Chinese (Chao & Tseng, 2002; Chen et al., 2003). Similarly, Japanese babies are pressed to develop indirect speech forms, assumedly to help fit in and not offend (Clancy, 1986). For example, the Japanese language allows a speaker to negate entire sentences once spoken to make an assertion less direct, perhaps in response to the listener’s expression. Japanese people rarely disagree or say “no” in public to avoid offending another or others. Self-recognition, by contrast, is consistent with a child’s sense of self as separate and autonomous, and the early press for self-recognition is more often seen among Western parents.

Keller, Yovsi, et al. (2004) found that, within culture, the proximal parenting style relates to the development of self-regulation and the distal parenting style, to the development of self-recognition. Between-culture differences were also found: The Nso infants, who experience greater proximal contact, develop self-regulation earlier than do Greek babies, and Greek babies, who experience greater distal contact, develop self-recognition earlier than do Nso infants; that is, the caregiving practices that predict later self-recognition and self-regulation are similar across cultures, but the emphasis on these caregiving practices and the emergence of the developmental outcomes with which they are linked differ. Keller, Yovsi, et al. relate the cultural differences in caregiving and in their developmental outcomes to differences between the communities in their prevailing ethics, namely, the Nso emphasis on interdependence (i.e., concerns with community) and the Greek emphasis on independence (i.e., concerns with autonomy).

Broadening Our Conceptions of Good Care

The proximal versus distal style of parenting is one of several useful ways of distinguishing between the care practices of communities that live by different ethics. Another valuable distinction is between types of sensitivity. In the West, sensitivity is equated with a host of caregiving characteristics, including contingent responsiveness to children’s signals, as well as promptness, cooperation, availability, and following the child’s lead. This interactive style is believed to promote autonomy, because the child perceives herself as in control and competent, certain that caring others are available if the need arises. However, the nature of sensitivity varies across cultures, and this may have implications for self-regulation and the processes associated with its development.

Cameroonian and German mothers, for example, differ in their sensitivity to positive and negative infant signals. Cameroonian mothers are more sensitive to infants’ signs of distress, and German mothers, to infants’ positive signals (Voelker et al., 1998). Similar differences between non-Western and Western mothers are reported by Friedliemeier and Trommsdorff (1999) and LeVine (2004). LeVine’s findings indicate that Gusii mothers of Kenya are more sensitive to their baby’s distressed vocalizations than are middle-class U.S. mothers, and that Gusii babies cry less than the U.S. babies. The Gusii practice of maintaining nearly constant contact with babies in the first year of life allows mothers to respond quickly to their infant’s distress. Gusii mothers are shocked by videos of American mothers allowing infants to cry, even momentarily. For Gusii mothers, prevention of crying through continuous contact is morally mandated. Yet Gusii mothers show little responsiveness to positive signals. Unlike middle-class U.S. mothers, they do not amplify positive expressions of emotions but turn away from infants who are getting positively excited, so as to calm and soothe them (LeVine, 2004).
Sensitivity in non-Western cultures may be more proactive, with adults and even children anticipating others' distress, or recognizing nascent signs of it, and taking measures to avoid it. There is evidence of this among the Efe, where adults sometimes comfort infants even before they are noticeably upset (Morelli, Henry, & Baldwin, 2002); so too among the Nso (Keller, Yovsi, & Voelker, 2002) and the Guusii (LeVine, 2004). In Japan, preschool teachers emphasize the importance of anticipating children's needs and see the child's role as waiting for the teacher to meet their needs (Rothbaum, Nagoaka, & Ponte, 2005). Anticipatory responsiveness breaks down the child leads/adult follows interactive style, prioritizing less the child's control, and making more ambiguous the distinction between self and other. The U.S. preschool teachers in the previous study reported that anticipation undermined the development of self-expression, self-assertion, and autonomy in young children.

Like parental sensitivity, parental control has different meaning and implications for self-regulation in other cultures. Control includes expressions of warmth in many societies living by ethics of community. For example, Chinese parents and teachers govern—guan—children by taking control, directing their behaviors, and placing demands on them (Tobin et al., 1989). Guan also means to love and to care for, and it is viewed in a positive light by adults and children alike. Japanese and Korean adolescents associate parental control (guan) with warmth and acceptance (Chao & Tseng, 2002). Control for many Asians is rooted in notions of family hierarchy, respect, obligation, and self-sacrifice. In contrast, control for many North Americans is negatively associated with feelings of closeness (measured in terms of cohesiveness; Nomura, Noguchi, Saito, & Tezuka, 1995). For them, control is antithetical to self-determination and positive caregiving, because it is rooted in heteronomy, inequality, and restrictiveness.

Because human qualities such as attachment and self-regulation take on very different forms and have different meanings, it should not be surprising that they develop in systematically different ways. In some communities, social development is fostered by distal parenting, sensitive responsiveness, and autonomy fostering practices. In other communities, social development is fostered by proximal parenting, sensitive anticipation, and authoritarian control.

**REFLECTIONS ON COHERENCE: CONSISTENCY OR FLEXIBILITY**

According to Western theorists, secure attachments and successful self-regulation are predicated on a coherent self. Although all cultures may value self-coherence, we believe there are important differences in the meaning of coherence and conceptions of self. Here we review evidence that Western laypersons and researchers emphasize intracultural consistency across persons, situations, and time, whereas non-Western laypersons and researchers emphasize extracultural flexibility across roles and contexts (Heine, 2001). Moreover, we attempt to show that theories of attachment and self-regulation are grounded in Western notions of self-coherence that highlight the all important role of autonomy. We also consider how attachment and self-regulation might be understood differently when non-Western notions of self-coherence, which rely much less on notions of autonomy, are adopted (see Table 20.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locus</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Central principle/value</th>
<th>One self/many selves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western coherence</td>
<td>Intraindividual</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Internalization, integration</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(across time, place, and person)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western (majority world) coherence</td>
<td>Extraintdividual</td>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Balance between demands of different relationships</td>
<td>Community/harmony</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research on Coherence

In the West, the self is viewed as relatively unchanging across situations and stable across time, and consistency is seen as essential to healthy functioning (Heine, 2001; Suh, 2002). Many Western theories of social functioning are predicated on this notion of self-consistency (see Kitayama & Markus, 1999, for a review). Consistency is much less valued in East Asia, where “an individual's relationships and roles take precedence over abstracted and internalized attributes, such as attitudes, traits and abilities. ... It is important for the East Asian self to be able to determine what the role requirements are for a given situation and to adjust self accordingly” (Heine, 2001, p. 886).

Evidence of greater emphasis on internal self-consistency in Western than non-Western communities comes from various quarters. In the West, individual attitudes are typically more powerful predictors of behavior than are social norms (Triandis, 1995). Belief in attitude–behavior consistency is more pronounced among Australians than Japanese—indeed, Japanese are more likely to align their actions with others’ beliefs than with their own (Kashima, Siegel, Tanaka, & Kashima, 1992), and Japanese manifest less susceptibility to dissonance (less consistency between one's own attitudes and behavior) than do Canadians (Heine & Lehman, 1997).

Whereas, for North Americans, self-coherence is evident in the consistency of underlying attitudes and dispositions, coherence for East Asians is evident in “attunement of the self with the social surrounding. ... It is this self in a specific social context that predominates in subjective experience” (Kitayama & Markus, 1999, p. 264). There is greater consistency among American than among Korean students’ self-views across social roles, such as son, daughter, and friend (Suh, 2000), and across hypothetical situations (Suh, 2002). Similarly there is more consistency for Americans than for Japanese when making self-descriptions when different people are in the room with them (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001), and when they are describing their personal versus public selves (see Kitayama & Markus, 1999).

Underlying different representations of cohesion are differences in attention, perception, and reasoning. Fiske et al. (1998) cite several studies indicating a tendency toward linear, analytic, decontextualized information processing in the West, and holistic, context-dependent information processing in the East. Eastern thought is often dialectical—in this context one thing is true, whereas in another context the opposite is true, or the middle way is endorsed (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, Norenzayan, & Ara, 2001).

Coherence in Attachment and Self-Regulation Theory

Coherence is a central construct in Western theories of attachment and self-regulation. In addition to entailing consistency between internal psychological characteristics (beliefs, emotions, dispositions, goals, etc.), the coherent self depicted in these theories is autonomous, unified, integrated, and authentic, as opposed to externally driven, inconsistent, fragmented, and false.

In attachment theory, children's coherence is most evident in their "internal working model"—the stable, integrated set of expectations and experiences pertaining to relationships and the self. A coherent model is one linking attachment and autonomy (i.e., it depicts a caregiver who fosters the child's autonomy by sensitively responding to needs for security). Adult attachment is assessed by the Adult Attachment Interview, which relies on the notion of coherent discourse—the consistency, clarity, succinctness, and most importantly, the meaningfulness of the attachment narrative. Individuals must fully own and integrate positive and negative aspects of experience for their narratives to be coherent. Autonomy allows for a sense of ownership of inner experience and integration of the narrative. This is evident in the term used for the most secure and coherent adult attachment category—autonomous (Fonagy, 1999; Main & Goldwyn, 1998).

In Western self-regulation theory, coherence is typically conceptualized as integration. It is sometimes operationalized as correlations between different self-regulatory constructs (involving emotional control, compliance, delay, etc.), or by one construct (compliance) over different situations or over time (Kochanska & Murray, 2000). Little attention is devoted to contextual factors. Self-coherence and successful self-regulation emerge when the individual freely and autonomously chooses goals, because such goals can be fully integrated with
other self-endorsed goals (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003; Eisenberg, Smith, et al., 2004; Ryan & Deci, 2000b).

More recent theories of self-regulation, particularly theories of social cognition in adults (see Cervone & Shoda, 1999, for reviews), place greater emphasis on situational differences than do the self-regulation theories focused on in this chapter. However, these theories depict situations and perceptions of situations as modifiable by self (Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Heine, 2001), they do not depict situations as part of self, and they link self-regulation with autonomy. These are quintessential features of Western self-coherence.

A very different notion of coherence in non-Western cultures is not predicated on ethics of autonomy, but on ethics of community, and, more specifically, on an emphasis not only on harmony, but also on respect, duty, obligation, and proper demeanor. Unlike values associated with autonomy (choice, freedom, agency), values associated with community are closely tied to specific persons (role relationships), places, and situations (public/formal vs. private/informal). They are meaningless when stripped of role and context. What makes the self coherent is not internalization, but coordination with others in the community. Coherence is less predicated on an independent, unitary, authentic sense of self, and more on an interdependent sense of self that is always mindful of particular others and particular contexts in which the self is situated: “Normative demands ... [are] perceived to be part and parcel of the self” (Kitayama & Markus, 1999, pp. 265–266).

The implications for attachment and self-regulation are profound. When coherence is defined in terms of community and harmony, relationships do not primarily serve to foster the self's goals, but rather to determine the self's roles. Without roles there is no self-coherence. As a result, coherence is less likely to be experienced or expressed as consistency. Consistency in self-regulation in different situations (public and private), or with different persons (ingroup and outgroup members), would not be seen as a marker of authenticity of self, but rather as a sign of incoherence and immaturity. Such behavior ignores the press for modifying one's behavior to accommodate to interpersonal and contextual demands (Fiske et al., 1998; Heine, 2001; Kitayama & Markus, 1999).

The Role of Balance in Coherence

Despite their emphasis on consistency, Western theorists are very focused on internal conflicts. Conflict is central to psychodynamic theory and was a major concern of behaviorists, including cognitive behaviorists. Healthy development is seen as the ability to link or integrate competing desires. This is seen in attachment theorists’ emphasis on the trade-off between the desire for attachment and the desire for autonomy (which, early in life, is manifested as exploration). The more secure the attachment, the more the child ventures outward, and the more the child ventures outward, the more she experiences fear and seeks security/attachment figures. Optimal functioning occurs when these competing needs are balanced and integrated. Self-regulation theorists’ central thesis is very similar: that there is a trade-off between socially desirable behaviors (attention, compliance, delay of gratification) and autonomy, and optimal functioning represents the balance and integration of the two. Autonomy is seen as leading to compliance (“committed” compliance), and compliance is seen as setting the stage for autonomy. In both theories, the key phenomena of interest (attachment and aspects of self-regulation) are inextricably linked with autonomy; the quality of the linkage determines the coherence of the organism. Both theories’ depiction of autonomy as the phenomenon with which all other processes must be balanced stems from the assumption of an independent selfway, and the equating of coherence with internal, autonomous integration of different aspects of self.

Conceptions of balance in non-Western communities have little to do with autonomy. The attachment balance in these communities is between attachment and role responsibilities. Harwood and colleagues (1995) emphasize the balance between closeness and “respectful attentiveness,” and investigators focused on Japan emphasize the balance between closeness and formal, role-prescribed behavior (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Rothbaum & Kakinuma, 2004). The central conflict involves different roles and contexts more so than different internal desires. The individual who has secure intimate relationships is more capable of fulfilling formal duties and role responsibilities, and of balancing different relationships (Heine, 2001; Rothbaum & Kakinuma, 2004). Similarly, self-regulation is a balance between soft-
hearted, self-sympathetic behavior and hard-hearted, disciplined behavior; the ability to know with whom and when to engage in each type of behavior constitutes self-coherence and effective regulation (Kitayama & Markus, 1999).

Western conceptions of attachment and self-regulation, which are predicated on an independent selfway, treat autonomy as central, and community and context as relatively peripheral. Non-Western conceptions, which are predicated on an interdependent selfway, treat the ability to act appropriately with different persons in different situations as central. Coherence in this case is located at the interface of self and context rather than internally. It is based less on free will, individual choice, and autonomous ownership of different ways of being, and more on fitting the self (different aspects of self) with contextual realities. Whereas autonomy is the connective tissue that allows for coherence in the West, context appropriateness is the connective tissue that allows for coherence in many non-Western communities. In the latter communities, coherence of attachment is evident when children know with whom and in what situations they can be intimate and dependent, and with whom and in what situations they must be reserved and accommodating. The situated self is always mindful of the particular persons and settings in which she is embedded.

CONCLUSION: JUST TWO PATHWAYS?

In this chapter we have taken to task Western theories of attachment and self-regulation for their assumption of a single pathway to valued forms of security and regulation. However, we may be vulnerable to a similar charge: The assumption of two distinct pathways may not do justice to the diversity of models of attachment and self-regulation, as well as to underlying conceptions of coherence that characterize human functioning worldwide.

There are competing views about the number of pathways that should be entertained in cultural studies: Some theorists feel more strongly than we do about the pervasiveness of two relatively distinct pathways (e.g., Greenfield et al., 2003). These investigators tend to lump together diverse cultures into two relatively separate pathways—typically, those from North America, and Northern and Western Europe, and those from the rest of the world. Other theorists accept the two-pathway paradigm but argue for subdivisions within them, sometimes as hybrid forms that combine elements of both categories (e.g., Kağıtçibaşı, 1996). Still others leave open the possibility of new, as yet unidentified pathways, while acknowledging the substantial evidence currently supporting the two-pathway view (e.g., Saraswathi, 2003). Finally, there is another set of views antithetical to the ones noted that question any press to identify larger pathways; for these theorists, each community is unique and cannot meaningfully be grouped with any other along comprehensive dimensions (e.g., Gergen, Gulerce, Lock, & Miwa, 1996).

In this chapter, our assumptions frequently conform to the first of these views—two relatively distinct cultural pathways. Yet we believe that science is best served when researchers leave open the possibility of many pathways, not just two. We described the majority world as living by ethics of community without strong justification for combining such diverse communities in a single category, and we sometimes defined these communities in terms of what they do not value (e.g., autonomy). When we defined these communities in terms of what they do value—harmony, community, accommodation—we did not acknowledge that these communities may differ in how they make sense of these constructs. We need to accept the possibility of new pathways as well as "subdivisions" within the two prevailing pathways.

Our understanding of attachment and self-regulation will be hindered, not advanced, by searching for the alternative to Western theories of these constructs. It will also be hindered if we resist attempts to identify "ways of being" common to people of different communities, and if we are unwilling to cluster these communities based on these qualities. Clustering has served to highlight some of the most important and valuable distinctions that we have developed in cultural studies (e.g., individualism–collectivism; independence–interdependence), and it is an indispensable tool for making sense of the remarkable variation that characterizes humanity. The problem with these distinctions is that they tend to be used in ways that oversimplify the solution is to resist that tendency and to be continuously mindful of exceptions that elucidate the complexities.
We began this chapter by considering one community—the Efe hunters and gatherers of the Democratic Republic of Congo—that challenges Western assumptions about attachment and self-regulation. We might have talked about them in a way that implied they best fit the interdependent pathway, living by ethics of community. But we are not completely convinced of this characterization. The Efe are self-reliant and independent in ways consistent with qualities typically associated with people who live by ethics of autonomy. This may be in part because of the way they make a living—hunting and gathering (Barry, Bacon, & Child, 1959). They are also an emotionally expressive people—expressing emotions publicly for all to witness. Gilda A. Morelli remembers with great amusement the sheepish look on Kebe’s face as the sounds of his angry wife grew louder as she approached our village. It appears that the moment she heard that Kebe was visiting with us instead of hunting, she expressed her great annoyance with him by yelling loudly and gesticulating widely, and continued to do so on her march from her camp to our village, about a kilometer. The seemingly unrestrained expressions of emotions such as anger are quite common among the Efe, and it took some time for us to get used to this.

Although this portrayal may be construed as an example of the need for a subdivision of the interdependent pathway, we would like to consider the possibility that it represents a third pathway, in which self–other tensions are navigated in a way not characteristic of the two identified pathways. Among the Efe, interdependence seems so profound that it is taken for granted—a given—and little appears to threaten it in any obvious way—certainly not acts that call attention to self or emphasize the distinct and uniqueness of self. Perhaps a closer study of acts that threaten survival, literally, may help us better understand the Efe selfway. We do not have a readily available script to describe this selfway, but we think it is worth considering ways to do so. We hope that this chapter contributes to this endeavor and, by doing so, points to other possible pathways to attachment and self-regulation.

NOTES
1. Gilda A. Morelli has lived and worked with the Efe of the Ituri Rain Forest of the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1981. The vignettes about them were taken from her field notes spanning over two decades. The names used are typical Efe names, but there is no correspondence between the name and the persons described in the scene. The Efe make a living by hunting and gathering forest foods, and working in local villages in exchange for agricultural goods such as rice and peanuts. To some they are known as “Pygmies” but this is a term they find pejorative.

2. In this part of the chapter, the theories, perspectives, and research referenced (unless noted) were developed primarily in English-speaking (United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and Western and Northern European communities, and are referred to by most as “Western” theories. We typically do not use this qualifier for the sake of simplicity in the sections on self-determination theory, attachment relationships, and self-regulation.

3. We juxtapose vignettes describing Efe children’s experiences with accounts of children’s experiences described by Western theorists concerned with attachment and self-regulation. These theories assume that the experiences they describe are common to all children. We hope the vignettes call attention to differences, as well as to similarities, between what occurs in one community and what is assumed to be universal.

4. Eisenberg and Spinrad (2004) define emotion regulation as “the process of initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the occurrence, form, intensity, or duration of internal feeling states, emotion-related physiological, attentional processes, motivational states, and/or behavioral concomitants of emotion in the service of accomplishing affect-related biological or social adaptation or achieving individual goals” (p. 338). This definition is like that used by Grodick, McMenemy, and Kuzowski (1999), but other conceptualizations exist (e.g., Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004).

5. Recent research examines how psychological processes such as temperament or effortful control moderate or mediate the relationship between security of attachment or maternal interactive style and behavioral regulation (e.g., Feldman, Greenbaum, & Yirmiya, 1999; Kochanska & Knaack, 2003). We do not review this research, because the findings do not alter the gist of what we have to say.

6. Much of the research we consider examines maternal interactive style in structured situations, most often in a laboratory setting, which asks the mother to play with her child, teach her child how to work a toy or play a game, or to get her child to do a task such as “cleanup.” Children’s emotional expression is usually observed in situations that are frustrating (waiting to get a toy or food) or upsetting (child is restrained). Children’s compliance is typically assessed in cleanup tasks or delay tasks with mother present, conscience, in terms of compliance in the absence of an adult, and responses to items that assess the “moral self” or to hypothetical moral situations.

7. A similar distinction is made between individual-
istic and collectivistic societies, with people in individualistic societies characterized as independent, and those in collectivistic societies, as interdependent.

8. The expression “majority world” is used in the remainder of the chapter to refer to the overwhelming majority of the world’s cultures and the vast majority of the world’s population, including, but not limited to, Asian, African, southern and eastern European, and Hispanic/Latino communities. We do not believe that there is homogeneity between or within these countries, but they have in common being neglected by prevailing theories and evidence, which are based overwhelmingly on studies of Western cultures.

9. What people notice and attend to includes appraising the situation, which contributes significantly to their emotional experience and expression (Mesquita, 2003).

REFERENCES


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